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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
ADVERS!l Possi;ss10N-COLOR oF TITL£-WRI'l'T£N lNS'rRUM£NT.-Where
the defendant under a parol gift of an entire tract of land, but without any
"paper" tit!~ took actual possession of only a part of the tract, but claimed
title up to its w:ell-defined boundaries for the statutory period, i~ was held,
in an action by the heirs of the donor, that the defendant had acquired title
to the whole tract. Nelson v. Johnson (Ct. of App., Ky., 1920), 226 S. W. 94.
The general rule is that one must claim under "color of title" to acquire
title to land by constructive adverse possession. See I8 MICH. L. Rev. 6g3.
The decisions are in conflict as to what constitutes "color of title." The
majority view requires some sort of written instrument. 2 C. J. I70. See
also 7 MICH. L. Rsv. 25I ; I8 MICH L. Rsv. 6g3. It would seem that the
reason for requiring "color of title" is to give some dependable means of
determining the extent of the occupant's claim and in a measure to give
notice of such claim to the owner. The necessity of a written instrument
has been dispensed with under various circumstances. \Vhere the adverse
holder has had actual possession of a part of a tract under a state of facts
which of themselves, though not adequate to constitute actual possession,
show the character and extent of his claim, it has been held that "such facts
'-' * * perform sufficiently the office of colcr of title." Bell v. Longu·orth, 6
Ind. 273; Hitt v. Carr, 62 Ind. App. So; Stanley v. Schoolbred, 25 S. C. 181.
\Vhere party claiming adversely entered without "color of title," actually
occupied part of a lot with a definite boundary marked upon ·the land to
which he claimed title, it was held he had constructive possession of the
whole. Hodges v. Eddy, 38 Vt. 327; Lang v. Clark, 85 Vt. 222; Pratt v.
Ard, 63 Kan. I82; Le Moyne v. Neal, I68 Ky. 292; Miniard v: Napier, 167
Ky. 208. Under facts similar to those of the principal case, where the party
goes into possession of part of a tract with well-defined boundaries under a
parol gift or contract of sale of the whole, a number of courts have held
1hat the donor or vendor is charged with notice of the extent of the oth~r
party's claim, and that therefore, as between the immediate parties and their
privies, no "color of title" is necessary for the doctrine of constructive
adverse possession to apply. Niles v. Davis, (lo Miss. 750; Davis v. Davis,
68 Miss. 478; N ormant v. Eureka Co., g8 Ala. I8r; Brown v. Norvell, g6
Ark. 009. But see Parker v. Kelsey, 82 Ore. 334; Allen v. Mansfield, lo8
Mo. 343. In view of the theory for rc!quiring '"color of title," given supra,
the cases seem correctly decided. That they are considered ~eptional, see
2 C. J. 232; 2 A. L. R. 1457.
CAmtJ£Rs-LtMITAnoN oF THii AMOUNT OF LtABJLIT\·.-The consignors
to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, at Yokohama, Japan; on
March 10, 1915, 56 cases of goods consigned
their own order at New
York, billed th.rough by way of the Southern Pacific Railroad and its connections. Only one rate was given in the bill of lading, and it contained a
d~livered

to
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clause limiting the amount of liability to $roo per package. Without new
billing, it came into the custody of the defendant railroad, and was there
lost in a collision. Defendant had filed schedules of rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission, which contained but one .rate applicable to the
shipment. Plaintiff; successor to consignor in interest,. sued for invoice value.
Defendant claimed that plaintiff was limited to $100 per package. Held,
plaintiff may recover invoice value of goods. U11ion Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Burke (February, 1921), U. S. Supreme Court.
For note OI\. decision in lower court, see 18 MICH. L. REv. 423. For the
purpose of the case, it was accepted that the property should be treated as
moving eastward ftom San Francisco under the Uniform Bill of Lading,
although the Yokohama bill was the only one issued. The Uniform Bill of
Lading provides that the amount of loss shall be the invoice value of the
goods, unless a lower value has been represented in writing, agreed upon,
or is determined by the tariffs upon which the rate is based. The court held
that since no choice of rates was or could have been given under the published schedules, there was no estoppel to limit the plaintiff to the "released"
rate (see Hart v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co., II2 U. S. 331), although the defendant contended that it was not necessary to the valuation agreement that
there should be such a choice of rates offered. Had defendants' filed schedules shown alternative rates for different valuations, since this shipment
was still under the Carmack Amendment, plaintiff would have been considered estopped to recover full value.. Kansas City Southern Rd. v. Carl, 227
U. S. 639; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 477. By
the magic invoked by filing the rates a contract would have been made conclusively binding on both shipper and carrier, whether the shipper knows
of,the rates filed or not. Boston & Maine Rd. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97;
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rd. Co. v. Robinson, 233 U. S. 173. On the
other hand, according "to the principal case-, if the shipper carefully reads
the Uniform Bill of Lading; and knowing that he might possibly make the
carrier liable for the invoice value, yet signs a contract limiting recovery
to the one value for which a rate has been filed, it would seem that he is
not estopped, for "the reason that another rate with full liability was not filed.
The principal case makes the ground for estoppel the selection of the lower
of two rates with limited liability, so that where there is no rate lower than
another there can be no estoppel. There are statements to that effect in.
the cases. In Cincinnati, New Orleans & Te~. Pac. Rd. Co. v. Rankin, 241
U. S. 319, the court said: ''Under our former opinions, the settled· doctrine
is that where alternate rates, fairly based on valuation, are offered, a railroad may limit its liability by special contract." See Great Northern Railroad Co. v. O'Connor, 232 U.S. 516; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Nieman-Marcus
Co., supra; Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657. But the
inconsistency shown above is- the result of the artificial develc.pment of estoppel in these cases. See Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 236 U. S. 278;
see 15 CoL. L. REv. 399, 475. The principal· case is undoubtedly right in
holding that limitation of the amount for wnich carrier is liable is an excep-
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tion to the carrier's common law liability, and that the rule governing tl)is
exception is not to be extended to apply where no choice of rates is given.
The defendant cannot go outside the filed rates, and with no choice offered
there is an illegal contract of limitation comparable to that in Boston &
Maine Rd. Co. Co. v. Piper, 246 U. S. 43g.
CoNSTITU'.l'IONAI. LAW-ElGHTr:ENTH

AMENDMl':NT-DoUBLE

]!i,"OP...RDY.-

Indictments under the National Prohibition Act, in five cases considered
together. In two cases there had been convictions under a stall~ statute more
stringent than the national law; in the other three there had been convictions under municipal ordinances. Held, convictions under the state statute
were a bar io indictments under.the national law; those under the municipal
ordinances were not a bar. United St<Ues v. Peterson et al., and four other
cases (C. C. A., 8th Circ., 1920), 268 Fed. 963.
The convictions und:er the ordinances were not a bar, since the state
had not delegated its concurrent authority to the municipalities ; but the
convictions under the state statute were held to be a bar because it was
not intended that one should be punished both under state and federal law
for the same offense. There is some early authority for such a holding;
see Commonwealth v. Fuller, 8 Met. 313; Cueth v. Overby, 3 Ky. 'Law 704,
where it is said that conviction in one jurisdiction would be a bar to an
indictment in another jurisdiction, since it is for the same offense. And in
Harlan v. People, l Douglas 207, it was said that it logically follows, from
'the fact of concurrent power in the states and; in the federal government
to pass laws punishing counterfeiting, that conviction in either state or
federal court is a bar to conviction in the other. But by the great ~ight
of authority a single act may be a violation of the laws of both governments, and conviction or acquittal in the courts of one is no bar to prosecution in the courts of the other. Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 132, 139;
U. S. v. Barnhart, 22 Fed. 285; U. S. v. Wells, 28 Fed. 522; U. S. v. Palan,
167 Fed. 991; see Fox v. Ohio, S How. 433; MotJre v. Illinois, 14 How. 56o;
U. S. v. Amy, 24 Fed. Cas, 792, 810; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 341, 38g.
In the very nature of things, two sovereignties cannot have jurisdiction over
the same ojfense, unless it is one arising under the law common to all, as
the law of nations; see U. S. v. Pirates, S Wheat. 197· Neither government
should be permitted to hinder the other in the enforcement of :ts own laws.
Otherwise, where the policy of one differs from the policy of the other, one
guilty of an offense against one sovereignty might plead in bar a conviction
ai;id comparatively l~ht punishment inflicted by the other. State v. Ran.1li11,
4 Coldwell 145; see U. S. v. Bamhart, supra. The criminal cannot complain, for he owes allegiance to both governments and is protected by both.
See State v. Moore, 143 Ia. 240, 21 Ann. Cas. 63, with full note on whole
subject, page 64. The jurisdiction which first has control over the subject
matter of the offense, by comity, should: continue to exercise jurisdiction
until judgment, thus avoiding embarrassing conflict. U. S. v. Wells, supra;
U. S. v. Barnhart, supra. Prior conviction may be taken into C'Onsideration
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in determining punishment; U. S. v. Pa/an, 167 Fed. 991; but the record of
a former acquittal should not even be introduced into evidence. Slate v.
Kenney, 85 Wash. 441. In the cases cited it is clear that both the states
and the federal government have "concurrent power" to make laws punishing the same acts ; hence, they may be considered direct authority for violations against state and federal laws passed under the Eighteenth Amendment. For the meaning of "concurrent power" under the Eighteenth Amendment, see 19 MICH. L. R.Ev. 329. In case of a state statute passed in aid of
the national act itself, the holding of the court in the principal case might
be correct; but the fact was that the state statute had been passed prior to
the national act. Apd compare U.S. v. Mason, 213 U. S. us. It should be
noted that the "double jeopardy" provision in the Federal Constitution,
Fifth Amendment, applies only to the federal courts. Sec Fo~ v. Ohio, U.
S. v. Barnhart, supra.
CoNS'tITUTIONAL LAw-L1mo:R ACT-INnEFlNlTlt OFPitNsi>.-Defendant wai;
indicted under the Act of October 2, 1919, c. 8o, 41 Stat. ~97', commonly
known as the Lever Act, for selling sugar at an unjust and unreasonable
price. The act provides: "That it is hereby made unlawful for any person
wilfully • • * to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling
or dealing in or with any necessaries; to conspire, combine, agree, or arrange
with any other person. * • * (e)· to exact excessive prices for any necessaries * • * Any person violating any of the provisions of this section, upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined nat exceeding $5,000, or be imprisoned for
not more than two years, or both • • •" On appeal to the Supreme Court
it was held that the indictment had been properly quashed on the ground
that the act under which the proceedings were instituted was so vague in
its provisions as to what was thereby made an offense that it was unconstitutional. Umted States v. L. Cohen Grocery CCI., Adv. Ops., Feb. 28, 192r,
No. 324For discussions of cases involving the \<alidity of statutes defining acts
amounting to an offense in terms in general as vague as those passed ·upon
in the principal case, see 18 M1cH. L. RE\'. 810; 19 M1cH. L. RJ>v. 218. See
also 19 MICH. L. Rl>v. 33?, discussing one of the lower court decisions under
the Lever Act. Many of the cases have involved regulations of speed and
lights of automobiles. There is no question that the Lever Act left the
matter pretty vague, but it probably is impossible to .frame a statute on
such subject that would be definite.
€0NsTrruT10NAL LAw-Rm·1:Ew oF Ac-uoN 011 ADMINISTRATION BoARn.-A
Wisconsin statute required that the approval of the application by the fire
and police commission of a city should be secured before any person could
engage in th<! business of a prwate detective. The standard! of qualification
prescribed by the statute for obtaining th. license is that the applicant shall
be a, person of good character, competency, and integrity. The plaintiff'>
claimed that the statute gave the fire and police co·mmission arbitrary power
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to give or withhold their approval for a license, and that therefore the law
was invalid as depriving the plaintiffs of due process of law and of the
equal protection of the law. Held, the statute dces not vest an arbitrary
power in the police and fire commissioners. It prescribes a standard of
qualification that is an ascertainable and known one, and is readily understood as a matter of common knowledge. Manufacturers' and l.lerchants'
Inspection Bureau v. Buech (Wis., 1921), 181 N. W. 125.
In this case, however, while holding that the legislation did not result
in a denial of due process of law, nor confer legislative authority on th~
fire and police commissioners, yet the court held that plaintiffs had stated a
good cause of action and were entitled tc relief because they alleged that
the commissioners capriciously and wrongfully refused to grant the applications. The principles involved in these cases are discus~ed in 19 Mrcu. L.

REv.

211.

CoNS'l'ITUTIONAL LAw-STATUTS RtcuLA'l'ING TH£ SAI.i-: oF TtxT-BOOKS.Public. Acts of Michigan, 191g, No. J&>, regulating the sale of school textbooks by prohibiting public officers from buying any books except those
listed with the state superintendent of schools and at certain fixed prices,
held constitutional, except as to Section 7', which, in making it unlawful for
retail dealers to sell books at higher prices than those listed, without limiting
such prohibited sales to school officers, is void as beyond the power of the
state: MacMillan Co. v. Joht1son (D. C., S. D., Mich., 1920), 269 Fed. Rep. 28.
Unquestionably, the legislature has· the general power to regulate the
conditions under which the state may deal with those who are desirous oi
selling text-books for use in the public schools. MlfcQueen v. Porl Huron,
194 Mich. 328. Plaintiff publishing company having no vested right to deal
with the school authorities, and not being forced to do so, may not then
con;Jplain because these authorities impose conditions upon which they will
purchase such text-books. Polzin v. Rat1d, McNally & Co., 250 Ill. stir.
The only invalidity appearing in the act is found in Section 7, providing that
no retail dealer shall sell any of the listed books at a price higher than
fifteen per cent above the wholesale price and the cost of transportation.
Such a provision is an unwarranted interference with the right of contract
and the right to engaged in the private business of bqpk-selling at retail,
and beyond the power of the state. For this general subject of the right of
legislatures to regulate prices, see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. UJ; 19 MICH.
L. Rev. 74- That statutes regulating the retail prices of books are n.>t
unknowre, however, appears from similar statutes found in the English enactments of the time of Henry VIII, Chapter IS, and from a statute enacted
in New York in I786. GRE£NL£AF's LAWS, p. 275.

CONTRACTS-MORAL CoNSID£RATION.-By the terms of an oral contract
under which plaintiff had effected a sale of land for defendant a commission
of $500 was due. Section n,98I of MICHIGAN COMPILED LAWS (I915) provides that "Every agreement, promise, or contract to pay any commission

650
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for. or upon the sale of any interest in real estate" shall be voicl unless the
same or some memorandum thereof be in writing. Defendant gave plaintiff
a promissory note for the amount stated, upon which note action was brought.
H elcl, the note was an enforceable promise, the consideration therefor being
the moral obligation upon defendant to pay plaintiff his commission. Bagaef
v. Prokopik (1920), 212 Mich. 265.
Under the influence of Lord Mansfield, who was obviously impatient
with the common law doctrine of consideration (see, for example, Pilla11s
v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr.* 1663), there was a marked movement about the
middle of the eighteenth century to recognize moral obligation, a species
of past consideration, as sufficient consideration to support a promise. See
Watson v. Turner, Buller's N. P. 129; Atkins v. Hill, Cowp. 284; Barnes v.
Hedley, 2 Taunt. 184; Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt. *36. Not long after
Lord Mansfield's death serious questions were raised as to how far moral
consideration should be recognized. In a learned note to We1111al v. Ad11e~.,
3 B. & P. 249 (1&>4), the cases were examined and the following stated as
the proper rule: "An express promise, therefore, as it should seem, can
only revive a precedent goodi consideration, which might have been enforced
at law through the medium of an implied promise, had it not been suspended
by some positive rule of law, but can give no original right of action, if the
obligation on. which it is founded never could have been enforced at law,
though not barred by any legal maxim or statute provision." In 1831, in
Littlefield v. Shee, 2 B. & Ad. 81 l, Lord Tenterden expressed doubts as to
the Mansfield doctrine, and in Eastwood v. Keiiyon, l I Ad. & El. 438 ( 1840).
the above quoted rule from the note to iVen11al v. Ad11ey was approved.
This is the English view today. See Wu.LISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 147; LE..\KE
o~ CoNTRACTS [6th ed.], 443. In truth, it would seem, as said by Parker, C.
]., in Mills v. W)•man, 3 Pick. 207, that wherever a man has deliberately
made a promise he is morally obligated to perform. In general, the Amer·
ican courts follow about the same rule. as applied in Eastu:ood v. Kenyon.
See, for example, Mills v. W)•man, supra; L:i,•ell v. Walbach, Il3 Md. 524,
33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 741. However, in a few jurisdictions there apparently
is a disposition to adhere to the broader view of Lord! Mansfield. See Davis
v. Morgan, 107 Ga. 504. applying a statute; Sutch's Estate, 201 Pa. 305.
The principal case indicates that in Mlchigan that view is well received,
particularly since contracts not complying with the statute there involved
are treated as really void. Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418.

CoNTRACTS-Vom AS STIFLING CoMPF.TitION.-Plaintiff and defendant
attended a British government auction, and to avoid competition an agreement was made for defendant to bid on their joint account and that whatever he purchased should be divided equally, each paying one-half the purchase money. After the sale defendant repudiated the contract. Held, the
agreement is unenforceable as ~eing against public policy, at all events where
the goods so sold are the property of the public. Rawlillgs v. General
Trading Co., [1920] 3 K. B. 30.
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WII.I.ISTON ON CONTRACTS, Vol. III, Sec. 1663, states that in cases of this
type the United States authorities regard the contract as void, while in England the contrary view is held. The court in the principal case, in referring
to the former English decisions, states that equity has taken a different view
than the commo111 law, discussing In re Carew's Estate, 26 Beav. I87, in
which a sale by the court was not set aside, although the two bidders agreed
not to bid against each other, but that one should bid up to £I500 and divide
the Jot between them. They bought it for £650, and the court held that this
agreement furnished no ground for opening the bidding or annulling the sale,
as there was no fraud, for the reserved price was put at £6oo. In GaltC'll
v. Emus, I Coll. 243, the v.ice chancellor hdd that an agreement between
two persons who are desirous of purchasing ;tn estate advertised for sale by
auction, that one of them shall not bid against the other, is not illegal. In
Levi v. Levi, 6 Car. & P. 239, cited to support the principal case, the jury
were directed that an agreement between brokers for stifling competition
was an indictable conspiracy. In the United States the courts have disposed
of this problem much more effectively. 20 L. R. A. 545, note. In Doolin v.
Ward, 6 Johns. Rep. I94, the Supreme Court of New York decided that such
an agreement was void and against public policy as tending injuriously to
affect the character :J.nd value of sales at auction. The point was decided
similarly in Ralphsnyder v. Shaw, 45 W. Va. 68o. The case of Phippen v.
Stickney, 3 Met. (Mass.) 384, points out the true principle by ruling that
"an agreement by two or more persons that one of them only will bid at
an auction of property, and will become the purchaser for the benefit of
them au, is illegal if it is made for the purpose of preventing competition
at the bidding and depressing the price of the property below the fair market
value. Otherwise, if the purpose of the agreement be to enable each of the
parties to become a purchaser, when he desires a part of the property offered
for sale and not the 'l!lhole lot; or if the agreement be made for any other
honest and reasonable purpose." The test as applied in Fisher v. Transportation Co., 136 Mich. 2I8, is that "where the circumstances show that the
consideration for the promise is in whole or in part an attempt to prevent
competition at a public sale, the contract is void," and it would seem as
though its application would effectually support the condusion of the English court and point out the distinction in the cases discussed.
CRIMINAL LAw-PosT-DAT£D Cattxs WITHOUT FuNns.-A statute provided that the issuance of a check or draft on any bank without authority,
when there were insufficient funds to cover the same, should be punishable
by fine. D issued a post-dated check without authority or funds and was
prosecuted under the statute. Held, the statute was not applicable to the
execution of a post-dated check. Smith v. State (Ark., 1921), 226 S. W. 531.
The only question in the case was whether a post-dated check came
within the provision "check or draft." The word "check'' has generally
been held to mean drafts payable presently upon a bank; while the word
"draft" includes instruments payable at a .future date. Thus, it would seem
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that in order to give the word "draft" any meaning at all it mll!t be held
to include instruments payable at a future date. See WORDS AND PHll.ASES,
p. 2195; Hinneman v. Rosenbach, 39 N. Y. S. g8. In the principal case the
court decided that a post-dated check was not within the statute because
they regarde., the statute as being in essence directed against false pretenses,
and that a post-dated check merely implied a promise to have sufficient fundo;
in the future. Accord, State v. F.?rris, 171 Ind. 562. But the same court
has applied the same reasoning to a check which was not post-dated. Jla.'f:ey
v. Stat,, 85 Ark. 499; State v. Fo.rton, 166 Ia. 181, Ann. Cas. ·1916E, 727,
contra; and if the Arkansas court applies the doctrine of the Jla.rey case,
supra, to situations arising under the statute, it is difficult to see just what
C"ses the statute will be held to cover.
DAKAGES-BittACH OP CONTRACT WHERE THl!Rt IS NO MAlllttT I'Olil THt

Alilnc:r.ic.-A contracted to deliver to B certain shavings for a specified period
at a certain price. There was no established market for such shavings, but
B resold some of them to an established customer. After a misunderstanding
A repudiated his contract, stopped delivering to B, and thereafter sold the
shavings to third parties. In a suit by B for breach of contract, it was held
that the measure of damages should be based on the difference between the
price B paid A and the price B received from his established customer, and
not on the basis of the price A received in his new sales after repudiation.
Kenn'm v. Brooks-Scanlon Co. (La., 1920), 86 So. 675.
The general rule in cases where the article contracted for has no market
value is that where the seller contracts to furnish such goods and t!:ie buyer
resells the goods furnished him, the measure of damages is the differencf!'
between the price the buyer was to pay the seller and the price he was to
receive in his resales. France v. Ga11det, L. R., Q. B. 199; Trigg v. Clas, 88
Va. 330, 13 S. E. 434 The principal case sanctions. this rule, but adds a
new point. It says that e\·en though the vendor, after wrongfully breaking
his contract, by new sales to third parties establishes a market for the article
sold, the measure of damages shall still re!llain the same. It holds that the
disappointed vendee should not have the benefit of the vendor's new sales.
Although it may seem that such a doctrine allows the vendor to profit by
his wrongful breach of contract, on a strict analysis of the true theory of
damages the rule seems reasonable and just. Damages should compensate
for injuries suffered, and their amount should be established with rea~on
able certainty. Brown v. Producers' Oil Co., 134 La. 672, 64 So. 674. There
is no certainty that the vendee could have established the market the vendor
succeeded in establishing by his new sales. The vendor's superior salesmanship or facilities may have gotten for him the higher price. What is certain,
though, is that the vendee could get the price he did get from his established
customer, and this should be the basis of the measure of damages.
DAMAGES-FLUCTUATING ExcHANGE.-A collision occurred between two
British vessels in New York harbor, and suit therefor was brought in that
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district, but repairs were made in England and paid for in English pound?<,
and dc.-murrage was also computed by agreement in that money. In reducing
such sums to American money for the purposes of the decree, it was held
tKat the rate of exchange applicable was that of January l, 1916, the date
upon which the damages were ascertainable, and not the rate prevailing at
the time of the finaf decree. The Verdi (April 3, 1!)2<>), 268 Fed. !,)08.
On .May 4. 1915, in Paris, France, defendant had delivered to the plaintiff
certain notes, due August 4. 1915. Suit was brought on these notes in New
York on May :;:r, 1!)2<>, and judgment was entered against the defendant on
November 16, 1!)20. Held, "the notes became payable in. dollars upon plaintiff's demanding of the defendant thefr payment in this state. The commencement of the action was equivalent to such a demand. The amount
due in dollars depended upon the rate of exchange existing at the time of
the demand, or, in this case, the commencement of the action." Revillo" v.
Demme (December 22, 192<>), 185 N. Y. S. 443
It will be observed that in both the above cases, the one in tort, the other
for breach of contract, the American courts have followed the latest decision
of the English court on this point. See Di Ferdinando v. SimoK Smits &
Co., Limited, [192<>] 3 K. B. 409; noted in 36 HARV. L. REV. 422; also 37 LAW
QUART. Rmr. 38-45.
All these decisions are based on the fundamental
rule of damage that the amount of recovery should be reckoned at
the time and place when and where the sum due first becomes liquidated,
and it seems somewhat surprising that there should have been so much
litigation of the point. The earlier cases in America said "the value
must be fixed according to the rate of exchange at the time of the trial."
Lee v. Willcocks, 5 Serg. an.d Rawle (Pa.) 48 (1819); sec also, Marburg
v. Marburg, 26 Md. 8 (1866). As Story also had said that the plaintiff
"is entitled to have an amount equal to what he must pay in order to
remit" to the foreign country ( CoNFI.ICT OF LAWS, § 310), the view
that the rate of exchange should be reckoned at the time of the
trial and not at the time of liquidation seemed to have attained almost the
dignity of an "American Rule" on the point, and it was not until the decision
in the Di Ferdinando Case, supra, that the matter was definitely settled in
England. The court in the last mentioned case said "fluctuations in the
value of the goods which ought to have been delivered' t're too remote as
a consequence of the original breach." So also we must exclude "subsequent changes in the value of the currency aiter the date of the breach."
Confusion would be avoided if we would keep in mind the statement in
Th• Verdi case, supra, that we are always trying to find the "equivalent in
dollars" at the time and place where the damages were ascertainable, and
this, too, whether the suit is for the breach of contract or in •,;rt, for a
conversion or trespass. If we reckon the value at the time of tlie trial
we violate our basic rule of computation, for though we thus take the place
of liquidation we do not take the time of liquidation, but depart from it.
It should be noted that in both the instant cases and jn !he English case of
Di Ferdinando v. Simon Smits & Co., Limited, supra, this rule benefits the
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plaintiff, because the rate of exchange was changing in favor of the country
in which the suit was brought. It may well be inquired whethtr the courts
would stand by the rule if the converse of this were true, so that the verdict would be less favorable to the plaintiff. If the New York court and
the United States court should .stick to the rule, they would apparently be
out of harmony with the theory of the New York court in Balier v. Drake,
53 N. Y. 2n (1873), as to the measure of compensation in case of conversion of stocks of fluctuating value, the rule which was afterward adopted
by the United States court in Galligher v. Jones, 129 l.1. S. 193 (1888). But
whatever may be said about consistency-if we may assume that the courts
of last resort in New York and in the United States will uphold their subordinate courts:-we seem at last to·have reached a uniform rule in England
and in America, and as this solution seems not only to be in accord with
justice but also not out of harmony with the fundamental theories of proper
legal compensation, we may assume that our law on this point is finally settled.
D1voRa:-FoREIGN Di::cREE, GRANTING HusuAND DIVORCE, A BAR ro W1FF.'s
ro Rl:coVER SuMs FOR NEcESSARI£s.-A wife brought an action against
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her husband in New York to recover from him the sums which she claimed
to have spent out of her separate estate, in discharge of his obligation to
provide her with the necessaries of life suitable to her condition. While
this action was pending the husband began an action in Nevada against the
wife for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. She appeared and
defended the action, denying the allegations of the complaint, and setting
up abandonment and non-support as a defen~e. The Nevada court entered
a final decree in favor of the husband, dissolving the marriage. He thereupon served a .supplemental answer in the action pending in New York,
setting up the Nevada decree as a bar. Held, the decree of the Nevada
court was a bar to the wife's suit in New York. Pearson v. Pearson (N. Y.,
1920), f29 N. E. 349.
The wife's claim was that her husband abandoned her without making
any provision for her support, and therefore all expenditures for necessaries made by her during the period of abandonment should be repaid to
her by her husband. On the other hand, her husband claimed that he was
justified in• leaving her upon her own resources during all the period for
which she is claiming compensation, because of her conduct. The pleadings
in the Nevada divorce case presented the question of the right of the husband to abandon his wife during the entire period when the expenditures
sued for were made, and this issue was tried and determined in the husband's favor by the decree. The decision in the principal case is therefore
sound, because in this case the wife is seeking to re-litigate the very issues
decided adversely to her by the Nevada court. This cannot be done under
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States
(Art. 4, Sec. I). See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230; Harris v. B~ek,
1!)8 U. S. 215; MINOR, CoNFLICT oF LAWS, p. 188.
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EVIDENCE-Pluviu:GED Co:uHUNlCA.TioNs BiiTWEEN HUSBAND AND W1FF."ANY CoHHUNICA.'l'ION" CONSTRUED.-An Oregon statute provided that neither
husband nor wife could be, without the consent of the other, examined as
to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage relation.
In an action for alienation of affections, held, this statute applies to all
communications, and not merely to communications confidential in the!r
nature. Pugsley v. Smyth (Ore., 1921), 194 Pac. 686.
Another state is thus added to those whose literal interpretation allows
such a statute, in the language of Professor Wigmore, "to create an intolerable anomaly in the law of privileged communications." W1GMORE, Ev.,
§ 2336. Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Utah and' Washington have construed "any
communication" to mean only those which in their nature seem confidential.
See Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 48i; Ward v. Oliver, 129 Mich. 300. California, Colorado, Illinois, Rho.de Island and Virginia construe the words in
their natural meaning to embrace all communications of whatever kind.
Park v. Park, 40 Colo. 354; Reeves v. Herr, 59 Ill. 81. The reason for this
difference of view no doubt arises partly from the conflict as to the extent
of the common law rule. The Minnesota court .says that the common law
was settled in England in 1842 by the case of O'Connor v. Majoribanks, 4
Mann. & Gran. 435, and extended to communications on all subjects. Leppla
v. Miti.n. Trib. Co., 35 Minn. 310. See also BEST, Ev. [1oth Ed.]. 175· Yet
many years later it was declared that the common law rule extended only
to confidential communications. People v. Mullings, 83 Cal. 138. Statutes
removing disability of witnesses on account of being parties to, or interested
in, the action have been held not to remove the disability existing between
husband and wife as to confidential communications. Gee v. Sr:.ott, 48 Tex.
510; Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U. S. J42. These decisions seem to indicate
that the chief reason for the privilege was. to protect the confidences of the
marriage, and not because of the common law doctrine of the legal identity
of husband and wife. O'Connor v. Majoribanks, supra, recognizes that
public polioy was the foundation for the rule, but denies that the rule would
be effective if extended only to confidential communications. It would seem,
however, that the rule should be coextensive with the reason. See 9 Mies:.
L. Rr:v. 248.
EVIDENCE-"THlRD DEGREE'' CoN~S6lON NO'l' VoLUNTAltY.-Plaintiff in
error had been convicted of murder solely upon his own repudiated confession,
which was made under the following circumstances : While being. held
incommunicado, without process, he was questioned almost continuously by
various officers for the greater part of four nights and three days ; no threats
of violence or hope of leniency were held out; he was warned that anything
he might say would be used against him. After professing total ignorance
of the crime during all this time, he finally confessed to having driven the
automobile from which the fatal shots were fired. Held, confession was not
voluntary and was inadmissible in evidence. Vinci v. The People (Ill.,
1920), 129 N. E. 193.
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In approaching the question of the admissibility of confessions two conflicting considerations must be borne in mind. On the one hand, the state
would be seriously handicapped in the apprehension and conviction of criminals if only spontaneous confessions were permitted. On the other hand,
the accused, who is presumptively innocent, has the unquestioned right to
make no statement whatever. There is considerable tendency, either by
statute or judicial decision, toward holding confessions not voluntary where
the only element of coercion is persistent and long-continued questioning.
KY. Sr. I9I2, c. I35, p. 542; Com. v. McClanahan, I53 Ky. 4I2; Peop/e v.
Bo,.e/lo, I6I Cal. 367 ;· State v. Thomas, 250 Mo. I89; Ammons v. State, 8o
Miss. 592; Gallahe,. v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. zif>. :Professor W igmore distinctly dis.approves of this tendency. 5 WIGMORE ON Evm1mc!l [2nd Ed.]
§ 85I. Baron Parke characterized it as "sacrificing justice and common
sense at the shrine of mercy." Reg. v. Baldry, I2 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 590.
The amount of persuasion which will render a confession involuntary must
depend largely upon the circumstances of each case, with due regard to the
age, mentality, and physical endurance of the prisoner. If the questioning
is so long continued that the prisoner's power of resistance is broken down,
or that his only hope of surcease seemingly lies in giving the answers that
the questioner expects, it would seem palpable that the confession is not
voluntary. Even if admitted, its probative value would be rather slight.
No valid objection is seen to a reasonable amount of questioning. It is submitted that the surest and most convenient way to prevent excesses by those
in authority, spurred on by the popular demand for the suppression of the
ever present "crime wave,'' is to render confessions inadmissible in evidence
when they are so improperly obtained. It is felt, however, that the trial
court is in a much better position to determine the effect which the interrogation had upon the prisoner than an appellate court can possibly be, and,
therefore, the power of review should be exercised very sparingly.
GIFTS-DIRECTIONS TO TH:E DtBTOR TO PAY Drurr To DoN:EE IS SuFFICitN'l'
D:ELIV:ERY.-Defendant was indebted to the plaintiff's testatrix. There was
no written. evidence of the debt. Plaintiff's testatrix orally directed the
defendant to pay $1,000 to her grandchild upon her death, which he did.
Plaintiff, as administrator of the estate, sued to recover the money on the
ground that the intent to make a gift was not executed by a delivery. The
question was wh~ther an unqualified direction by the creditor of a debt
unevidenced by any writing to the debtor to pay another was a sufficient
constructive delivery. It was held that, the creditor having done all that was
possible under the circumstances to put the debt 'OUt of his control, there
was a sufficient constructive delivery. Dinslage v. Stratman (Neb., I920),
18o N. W. 8I.
To be a valid parol gift, there must not only be an intent to give but
there must be a delivery. Irons v. Smallpiece, 3 B. & Aid. 55I (I8I9). But
just what will constitute a delivery· has frequently troubled the courts. In
Poff v. Poff (Va., 1920), 104 S. E. 7I9, I9 MICH. L. Rr:v. 552, the creditor of

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
a debt l•nevidenccd by any writing orally directed the debtor to pay another
with the intent of making a gift to that person. The court held there was
no delivery, as no instrument by the use of which the debt could be reduced
into possession was delivered to the donee. In Cook v. Lum (18g3), 55 N.
}. L. 373, where the only evidence of the debt was a piece of paper with a
column of figures, the court held that the delivecy of this paper to the donee
with the intent of making a gift was not a valid gift; for the donor parted
with nothing which was essential to his own dominion over the money in
question. To be a delivery of a chose in action .in the above jurisdictions,
there must be delivery of the donor's voucher of right or title to the donee;
and if there is no written evidence of the chose the donor, it would seem,
must create written evidence if he would make a valid gift. Cook T. Lum,
supra; Adams v. Merced Stone Co. (1917), i78 Pac. 4!)8. There is another
line of authoritie!I, however, which follow the doctrine laid down in the
principal case, and hold that where the creditor of a debt unevidenced by
any writing directs the debtor to pay it to another the gift is executed
because the donor has done all that could be done under the circumstances
to make a delivery. Ebel v. Piehl (1903), 134 Mich. 64. It is interesting to
note that the court in the principal case does not rest its decision upon the
ground that no delivery was necessary in such cases, but satisfies itself with
saying "there was an absolute completed gift when Thersa Stratman directed
the defendant to pay the money to Tracey, and there was a sufficient constructive delivery." Just what constituted this construc;:tive delivery outside
of the intent to give is hard to say. It would seem that the effect of the
court's decision is to hold that no delivery is necessary when the thing
sought to be given is a :chose in action unevidenced by any writing, and
that another limitation is thus placed upon the doctrine of Irons v. Smallpiece, supra. It is submitted: that the cor.clusion at which the court in the
principal case arrived was correct, but that the decision might well have
been placed upon the ground that no delivery in such cases is necessary.
Fr:r: NOT "REAsoNABU: AND Ni;cr:ssARY
a suit brought under the Iowa Code, which allows
the estate of the wife to be held for "reasonable and necessary famif~
expense," it was held that litigation expenses incurred by the husband in
defending a charge of felony were not '"family expense," and that the estate
of the wife was not liable therefor under the above statute. Sager, Su•eet,
and Edwards v. Risk et al, (Iowa, 1920), 18o N. W. 299.
The liability of the wife for "family expense" is entirely statutory, the
husband being under obligation to pay all such expenses under the common
law. ·McCartney & Sons v. Carter, 129 Iowa 20; Martin v. Ver/res, 130 Iowa
175· Hence, the liability of the wife must be determined entirely from the
construction of the statute and the meaning of the words "family expense."
The meaning of this phrase has generally been limited to things used in the
family, kept for the family use, or beneficial thereto. Smedley v. Felt, 41
Iowa s88; Phipps v. Kelly, 12 Ore. 213, 6 Pac. 70'/· But this is not nccesHuseAND AND W1FE-A'I'TORNEY's
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sadly limited by those things that are reasonably necessary for family use
so long as they in fac~ go to the family support or are used jointly by the
husband and wife. The extreme of this appears in Neasham v. McNair,
103 Ia. 695, in which the wife's estate was held for an expensive stick-pin
purchased and used by the husband exclusively. This was held to be family
expense upon the basis that since~it was an article of personal adornment
commensurate with the wealth and position of the family, it was "family
expense" to the same degree as expensive clothing, which has always been
considered in that category. On the other hand, a buggy purchased by the
husband primarily for his personal use and to aid him in carrying on his
professional duties as a doctor is not within this classification. S!aver Carriage Co. v. Beudry, 138 Ill. App. 147. The argument of the plaintiffs in the
principal case is based upon the holding of various courts that medical
expenses incurred by the husband for his own illness are expenses of the
family for which the wife may be held under similar statutes. Vest v.
Kramer, - Ia. -, 114 N. W. 886; Murdy v. Skyles, IOI Ia. 549. 70 N. W.
714; Leake v. Lucas, 65 Neb. 359, 9r N. W. 374. And the claim is that liti·
gation expenses should fall into the same category as medical and surgical
expenses. The basis brought forward to support this is that all such expenses
benefit the family in that they tend to return the husband to the bosom of
his family. The court seems to adopt the sound view when it says that
such an argument, if applied to expenses of litigation, would impose a
liability on the wife for any legal difficulties in which the husband might
become involved, so long as they might, by a successful culmination, result
in making the husband better able to support his family. Such a result does
not seem contemplated by the statute, which makes the wife liable for "only
reasonable and necessary family expense."
HUSBAND AND W1P.F.-PosTNUPTTAL CONTRACT -ro PAY W~'G. AN A1.r.owANcr:.-The plaintiff and defendant, who were husband and wife, had been
living apart for several years by mutual consent. The defendant promised
to pay his wife a monthly allowance until such time as they should agree
to live together. The wife brings suit for two unpaid installments. Held,
that the contract was Yalid and not contrary to public policy. Vanderb14rg/J
v. Vanderburgh (Minn., 1921), 18o N. W. 9')9.
At common law husband and wife were considered as one person. l
BL. CoK. 442· And contracts between husband and wife were void. 2
KENT, Cou. 129; Farwell v. Johnson, 34 Mich. 342. In most states statutes
have given the wife unlimited capacity to contract. and under such statutes
contracts between husband and wife are binding. Winter v. Winter, 191 N.
Y. 162; Cole v. Cole, 231 Mo. 236. However, the law looks with disfavor
upon contracts tending to interfere with the continuance of the marriage
relation; and contracts whereby the husband agrees to contribute to the
support of the wife are invalid if the consideration or a part thereof is an
agreement to continue the separate life. Hill v. Hill, 74 N. H. 288. But if
the separation already exists at the time of entering into the contract and
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is not induced or encouraged by it, the husband's agreement to pay the wife
a stipulated' allowance has been held binding. Pettit v. Pettit, 107 N. Y. 677.
In the priilcipal case, smcc the parties were living apart and the c1>ntract
by its terms looked forward to a termination of the separation rather than
to its continuance, the decision seems to have been correct.
HUSBAND AND Wrn:.-\Vum MAY fucovtR FROM HUSBAND FOR INn:cTION
VSNERSAr. D1sus:s.-Plaintiff's husband, having contracted a yenereal
disease, communicated it to her. In an action for damages, held, plaintiff
may recover. Crowell v. Crowell (N. C., 1920), 105 S. E. 2o6.
The case represents a further addition to the growing list of authorities
which allow a wife recovery fr~m her husband for personal injuries inflicted
by him. Furthermore, it is the first case in which infection with ·venereal
disease has been the tort sued upon. The common law, because of the fictitious merger of the wife's existence into the husband's, denied her atty right
of action against him. The Married Women's Acts do not expressly allow
it; but, with some variations, provide that the wife may sue or be sued separately for wrongs done to or by her.as though she were unmarried. Courts
which refuse the wife an action argue that these statutes, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed, and therefore the
words "sue separately as though unmarried" must be construed as effecting
no more than a. procedural change by permitting her to enforce her common
law rights without joining her husband. Consequently, they do not add to
her rights by giving her an action which she did not possess at common law.
Thompson v. Tlwmpsoii, 218 U. S. 6n (noted in 9 M1cH. L. Rsv. 440)
decided by a divided. court in 1910, is a recent leading case adopting this
constr.uction. Justices Harlan, Holmes and Hughes were the dissenters,
saying "the effect [of such a construction is] to defeat the clearly expressed
will of the legislature by a construction of its words that cannot be reconciled with their ordinary meaning." This dissenting opinion was crystallized
in 1914 in the decision of Bro1un. v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42 (noted in 12 YICH.
L. Rsv. 700), in which the Connecticut court blazed the trail by allowing the
wife to recover from her husband for assault and battery. The court recognized the Married Women's Act was intended to work a real change in
the marriage status by allowing the wife to retain after marriage het" separate legal existence and pre-nuptial legal rights, and consequently to recover
damages for injuries tortiottsly inflicted upon her, whether the defendant
was a stranger or her husband. This seems to be a reasonable construction
of the language of the statutes and at the same time it reaches a result in
harmony with the modem social order. The next case ailowing recovery
was Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124 (1915). However, the court was helped
to its decision by the unusual wording of the Oklahoma statute, which provides that "women shall retain the same legal existence and legal personality after mar~iage as before." OKI.A. fuv. LAws, 1910, Sec. 3363. But in
Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H. 4 (1916), the court construed a :itatute of the
usual form to allow the action. In Fitzpatric.k v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167 (1916),
WITH
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the court allowed recovery by the wife's administrator for her wrongful
death at the hands of her husband, but considerable reliance was placed upon
the wording of the Arkansas statute, which, in addition to giving the wife
the right "to sue and be sued,'' provided that she should "enjoy all rights
and be subjected to all the laws of the state as though she were a femme
sole." Acts OF ARKANSAS, 1915: Act to Remove Disabilities of Married
\Vomen, Sec. I. The court thought that even though the "sue and be sued"
clause might, by strict construction, effect only a procedural change, yet the
additional phrase removed the common law restriction upon the wife's rights,
conferred the right to sue her husband in tort, and consequent~}' gave her
administrator the same right. Johnson v. J ohnso11 (Ala.), 77 South. 3:5
(1917), and p,.osser v. Pro.sser (S. C.), 102 S. E. 787 (1920), were, however,
decided squarely upon what might be called the modern social \nkrpretation
of the usual form of Married Women's Acts. The principal case is the
latest of the series, and it, too, cannot be explained by any speciaJ wording
of the statute. The rapidity with which these decisions are being handed
do~vn is a fair indication that in a few years the time-honored dfr.~bility of
the wife to sue her husband for personal injuries will be ancient history.
lN'.l'OXlCATlNG LIQUORS-LF.GAL POSSESSION UNDER PROIUBI'.l'ORY STATUTJ::.
-The defendant, who accepted a friend's invitation to take a drink of intoxicating liquor, was indicted for having liquor in his possession, under a
statute providing that "It shall be unlawful for any person * * * to have in
his possession any intoxicating liquor; * * * and such possession and proof
thereof shall be prima facie evidence that said liquor was so held and kept
for the purpose of unlawful sale or disposition." The trial court charged
as follows: "The word 'possession' has a well-defined meaning, and lt is
this: I .have in my possession a spectacle case; if I pick up a glass containing whisky I hav.e in my possession whisky." lt was held that this charge
was erroneous, since the legislative intent, as collected from the context of
the entire statute, was to prohibit possession for the purpose of unlawfol
~ale or distribution. Slate v. Jones (Wash., 1921), 194 Pac. 585.
"Possession" has been defined as that condition of facts under which
one can exercise his pcwel' oYer a corporeal thing at his pleasure, to the
exclusion of all other persons. Rice v. Fra~•scr, 24 Fed. .¢o. The conception
of the Civilians was that the a11im11s domini, or intent to deal with the thing
as owner, was in general necessary fo turn a mere physical detention into
juridical possession. SAVlG"1V, Jus Poss:.:ssrnNJS, bk. II, § 21. While the
c:ommon law likewise includes intent as an element of possession, its requirements are not so -comprehensive as those of the Roman law. It is sufficient
under the common law that there be an intent to exclude all other persons,
and it is not necessary that there should be an assumption of the role of
absolute owner. Vide the case of a. tenant for years, or that of one having
a possessory lien. See HoLMES, CoMMON LAW, p. 220. Thus, it has been
quite properly said that "Possession does not necessarily dC'pend on title. * * *
Title il! concerned with the internal connection of the owner with his prop-
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erty. * * * It is not the actual dominion but the right to dominion. * * "'
Possession, on the other hand, is an external characteristic of property. * * *
Possession may be transferred where title is not. * * * Possession may bi
termed control with intentfon to e,rclude." Note on Regina v. Ashwell, 16
Cox C. -C. 1, in 7 CoL. L. Rev. 395. It would seem that in a certain class of
cases possession might exist without the intent to exclude al! other persons;
in fact, without any intent. Such cases are those where chattels are lost
upon the land of one person and taken by another before the owner of the
land even has any knowledge of their existence. Regina v. Rowe, C. C. 93;
Kincaid v. Eaton, g8 Mass. 139· In such instances the only discoverable
intent with regard to the chattels must be implied from the larger intent to
exclude the public from the land, and hence from everything upon it. On
the other hand, the classification of the servant's detention of his master's
goods as custody rather than possession would seem to deny the· designation
of possession to a state of facts including both control and an intention to
exclude. And it would be a useless refinement to attempt to show that it
were otherwise. This exception, however, is explicable upon historical
grounds. When the servant was a slave and had no standing before the law,
this fact, as well as the master's actual power over him, conduced to the
idea that the custody of the slave was in reality the possession of the master.
Disregarding, however, a few such apparent exceptions, it can be said thi.t
the common law principle is that a physical detention coupled with an intent
to exclude all other persons is sufficient to constitute possession. At first
blush, it may seem that the decision in the principal case has injected an
additional element into the common law definition. But such is not the case,
although of course it would have been competent for the legislature 10 give
the term "possession~' any meaning which it saw fit, and the court would
have been bound to apply it in that sense. What the statute does, however,
is simply to make it unlawful to have possession of intoxicating liquor under
such circumstances as would tend to facilitate sale and distribution· thereof.
Such being the clear intention of the legislature, as gathered from the context of the entire act, the court was bound to effectuate it; and in refusing
to hold unlawful possession under any other circumstances than those indicated, its decision is unimpeachable. For a similar statutory interpretation,
•see People ex rel. Darling v. Warden of Tombs Prison, 134 N. Y. Supp. 335.
See also Ford v. State (Ind., 1921), 129 N. E. 625, where defendant had in
his possession whisky owned by him. in common with another. This was
held a violation of a statute making it unlawful to keep intoxicating liquor
with intent to furnish or otherwise dispos.e of it.
JURY-EXCUSING JUROR ~ NOT ENTITLE DEFENDANT TO ANOTHER PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE.-Appel!ant was convicted of the crime of statutory rape.
After the jury• had been passed for cause and appellant had exercised four
peremptory challenges, the court excused one of the jurors on account of
sickness. Appellant objected to this juror being excused unless the court
should grant him an additional peremptory challenge, claiming that he did
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pot intend to challenge this particular juror. The court refused. On appeal,
it was insisted that this proceeding in effect deprived him of one peremptory
challenge. Held, that the trial court properly refused to allow an additional
challenge. State v. Pettit (Idaho, 1920), 193 Pac. 1015.
This case adds one more to the list of those decisions repudiating the
doctrine laid down in People v. Stewart, 64 Cal. 6o; and followed in People
v. Brady, 72 Cal. 490; People v. Wong Ark, 96 Cat. 125; People v. Zeiler,
135 Cal. 462, and People v. Weber, 149 Cal. 325. The statutory provision
construed in the Stewart case was identical with that in the instant case,
and provides that when a juror was discharged a new juror might be swom
and the trial begin anew, or the jury might be discharged and a new jury
impaneled. It was held there that the statute allowed additional peremptory
challenges. But that case was not welt considered. The court assumed
that a trial beginning anew means the impaneling of an entirely new jury.
Such a construction makes the section of the Code as a whole incongruous,
for it places the two alternative provisions on the same plane and gives to
each the same scope and meaning. The effect would be to give the accused
the election to discharge the whole jury or not, as he saw fit, whereas the
Code expressly placed this election with the court. Judged by all the wellrecognized rules of construction, the legislature certainly did not intend
both alternatives to mean the same thing. The word "trial" in its restricted
sense includes the investigation of facts only. Jenks v. State, 39 Ind. 9. The
decision of the Stewart case was carefolly reviewed in State v. Hazledahle,
2 N. D. 521, and its unsoundness conclusively pointed out. The North Dakota
case was followed in State v. De Weese, 51 Utah 515, and in State v. Carnwuche, 141 La. 325. Even the later California decisions, while still adhering
to the doctrine laid down in the Stewart case,. intimate that if it were now
a question of :first impression they would adopt a different construction. The
number of peremptory challenges to which a party is entitled is solely a
matter of procedure in which a party has no vested right. The legislature,
therefore, may increase or diminish the number at will. Hopt v. Utah, no
U. S. 574- If, therefore, the statute allows no extra challenges in such situations as that in the instant case it cannot be successfully contended that the
right to additional challenges exists. State v. De Weese, supra. It is submitted that the defendant in any case could be in no worse position, so far
as his peremptory challenges were concerned, when the new juror was sworn
on his voir dire than he would have been if the juror had not been discharged
and he had exhausted all his challenges before the last juror was called into
the box.
JuRY-Wo:u:tN AS ]URoRs-Wo:u:AN'S Su11!1RAGt AMSND:U:tNT.-Defcndant,
who was convicted on a charge of larceny by a jury of eleven men and one
woman, had on the trial :first exhau~ted his peremptory challenges at).d then
challenged the woman juror for cause on the ground that a woman was
prohibited from sitting as a juror by the state constitution, in which reference to a jury of "m~n" was made. Held, that the woman in question was
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a properly qualified juror under the constitution and laws of Michigan.
People v. Barltz (Mich., 1920), 18o N. W. 423.
The court reached this conclusion, largely, on the basis of the general
principle of constitutional construction that a constitution should be construed, if its language is appropriate, so that it will accomplish the purpose
the people intended it to accomplish. Here the purpose of the amendment
was to do away with the distinction between men and women as to being
electors. The court concluded that by being thus made an elector a woman
was placed in a class which made her eligible for jury duty under the Michigan statut'e providing that jurors should be selected from among persons
having the qualifications of electors. In Parus v. Dist. Court, etc., 42 Nev.
229, under a similar constitutional amendment and statute, the court reached
a like conclusion in regard to grand jury service. For a contrary view, see
the dissenting opinion in that case and the approving comment thereon in 17
MICH. L. Rsv. 271. See also the older case of McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo.
719. .In the recent case of Jn. re Grilli, 179 N. Y. S. 795, an inferior New
York court decided that the woman's suffrage amendment in that state did
not make women eligible as jurors, since by the statute in force there jury
service was dependent on certain age and property qualifications and was not
incidental to and a part of suffrage. Perhaps, loo, this ·case might be distinguished from the principal case in that the New York statute expressly
provides that a juror shall be "a male citizen," while the Michigan statute
merely provides that jurors are to be chosen· from among_ properly qualified
electors. In all jurisdictions, however, it seems to be actepted as law that
as long as trial by jury as known at common law shall be secured to all and
shall remain inviolate, the legislature may fix the qualifications of jurors,
even though they ma.ke the qualifications different from what they were at
common law. So in E~ parte Eben Mana, I78 Cal. 2I3, a California statute
authorizing women jurors was held valid.
MAS'tr:it AND StRVAN't-DU'tY 'tO AID An.ING OR INJl"R£II EKPI.OYU-It

was alleged that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant; that while
he was working in the latter's gravel pit he was overcome by the heat and
rendered unable to care for himself, and that defendant ·thereupon placed
him in a wagon box, where he was even more exposed to the heat, and left
him there unattended for four hours, whereby he was made worse, suffered
permanent injury, etc. On demurrer, held, the declaration stated a cause of
action. Carey v. Davis (Iowa, 1921), 18o N. W. 88g.
The liability was not placed upon any fault of defendant in causing
plaintiff's sunstroke. Ordiharily, a mere stranger is under no legal duty to
be a good Samaritan. He can "pass by on the other side" and let the jnjured
man die, without legal liabillty. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649;
Griswold v. B. & M. Ry. Co., 183 Mass. 434. There are statements to the
contrary in Whitesides v; Squthern Ry. Co., 128 N. C. 229, but the case is
unsatisfactory as authority. It is stated as the general rule that, aside· from
special contract, an employer is under no legal duty to furnish medical aid
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to injured employees where he is not responsible for the mJury, S LAnATT,
MASTS!t AND SERVANT,· 6179, and cases there cited; nor to rescue employees
from imminent peril. Allen v. Hixson, iii Ga. .¢o. But in several wellconsidered cases of recent date it is very clearly stated that where an
employee becomes incapacitated to help himself by reason of sickness, injury,
etc., although not through the fault of the employer, the latter is under
duty to make all reasonable effort to prevent loss of life or great injury.
Hunicke v. Meramac Quarry Co.; 212 S. W. 345 (Mo., 1919); Bessemer
Land and Impr-0veme11t Co. v. Campbell, 121 Ala. 50; Trou:man's Adm. v.
L. & N. Ry. Co., 179 Ky. 145; Olrio & Mississippi R. Co. v. Early.. 141 Ind.
73. With this doctrine the instant case is in accord.· However, in all of
these cases cited the business involved was a hazardous one, and in some
of them the doctrine is expressly limited to such business. In this aspect
the principal case is an extension upon the doctrine. If so, it would seem a
justifi~ble extension. With an employee beyond self-help .and in danger oi
death or great permanent injury, with an employer peculiarly able to give
the necessary aid, it is surely not a grievous burden to require him to make
reasonable use of the means at hand to save the life or prevent the permanent injury. The doctrine should be· limited to emergencies. There is, how·
ever, another possibility in the case. Where one who is under no duty to
give aid undertakes to do so, "his position is changed and he is bound to use
reasonable care not to aggravate the injury instead of helping it. Depue , •.
Floteou, .mo Minn. 299; Ry. Co. v. Marrs, II9 Ky. 954; Northern Cmt. Ry.
Co. v. State, 29 .Md. 420; Dyche v. Ry, Co., 79 Miss. 361; Gates v. Chesopeok.e
& Ohio R. Co., 185 Ky. 24 See, however, Union Pacific R. Co. v. Cappier
and Griswold v. Rf;. C.o., supra. The defendant in the instant case, having
taken charge of the plaintiff, was bound to use reasonable care not to
increase tlie danger. As the court expresses its approval of this doet~ine a!>
1Vell as of that noted above, and do·es not state upon which it rests its
decision, neither part of the case can be taken as dictum.
0

MAST.ER AND S.ERVANT-ILuiGAL EHPLOYHllNT oF A Mn<oR N!lGLIGSNO:
Psa Ss.-Plaintiff, a boy less than fourteen years of age, was employed by
defendant to drive a delivery wagon, in violation of the Child Labor Law.
In the course of his employment he either fell or was thrown from the
wagon and W:1,S injured. "Held, that employment of a minor in violation of
statute constitutes negligence per se, and if injury to such child proximately
results from the employment a right of actron in its favor arises. Terry
Dairy Co. v. Nolley (Ark., 1920), 225 S. W. 887.
The conflicting minority view is that the unlawful employment is Dnly
evidence of negligence to be considered by the jury with other facts tending
to show negligence. Stehle v. Jaeger Automolic Machine Co., 220 Pa. 617.
Berdes v. '.fremont and Suffolk Mills, 209 Mass. 4Bg. The prevailing view
that such illegal employment is negligence per.se in an action by the child
for injuries received in the course of the employment seems to rest on the
soUild legal reasoning that the violation of a duty created by a statute is the
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same as a violation of a duty created by a rule of the common law. And
if in either case such vfolation results in injury to ~nother, the wrongdoer
is liable to him as a matter of law. Lee v. Stei;lillg Silk Mfg. Co., 93 N. Y.
Supp. 56o. The fact that the law may impose a penalty makes no difference
unless the penalty be expressly given to the party injured in satisfaction of
such in;ury. Klatt v. The N. C. Foster Lumber Co., 97 \Vis. 641. In determining when such employment shall be "regarded as the proximate cause of
the injury, and therefore actionable negligence, the courts are often very
liberal to the child. For example, in Iro1i and Wire Co. v. Green, 108 Tenn.
161, the company was held liable for injuries sustained by a twelve-year-old
boy who had left the building where they had set him to work and was
injured while playing with some panels of iron fence on the premises, on
the ground that he would not have been on the premises had he not been
employed by the company. The employer cannot contend that such injury
was not the proximate cause on the ground that the injury was not foreseeable, because the statute itself indicates that such children are unfit by
reason of their indiscretion to be so employed: E. P. Breckenridge Ca. "·
Reagan, 22 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 71. The same question arises under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, where the majority opinion holds, as here, that
the employer's failure to perform his statutory duties for his employees'
i;afety is negligence per se. Paul Mnfg. Co. v. Racine, 43 Ind. App 695.
NEGLIGENct-P.EDESTRIAN CROSSING STRf:ET' RAILWAY TRACK-ERT<OR OF
JUDGMENT-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-The plaintiff, before starting to cross
a street, saw a car more than a block away rapidly approaching, and ·when
he had crossed the first track saw that the car was approximately thirty feet
away, but thinking that he could get across without being struck proceeded
without increasing his speed, and was struck. Held, he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. McGuire v. New York Rys. Co.
(N. Y., 1920), 128 N. E. 905.
A pedestrian is bound to make reasonable use of }lis faculties before
crossing a street railway track, in order to ascertain the nearness of
approaching cars. That is, the so-called "look and listen" rule applies to
street raihyays as well as to steam railways. Hooks v. Hu11tsville Ry., Ligli!
.Y Power Co., 147· Ala. 700; Doherty v. Detroit Citi::ens' St. Ry. Co., u8
Mich. 209; Riska v. Union Depot Ry. Co., 18o Mo. 168; Kappiu v. Mell"opolitan St. Ry. Co., 81 N. Y. S. 442; Harpham v. Northern Ohio Traction
Co., 26 Oh. C. C.R. 253; Sullivan v. Consolidated Traction Co., 198 Pa. St.
187; Stafford v. Chippewa Val. Blee. Ry. Co., 110 Wis. 331. But see cor.tra:
Los Angeles Traction Co. v, Conneally, 136 Fed. 104; Marden v. Portsmouth.
K. & Y. St•. Ry. cl}., IOO Me. 41; Roberts v. Spokane St. Ry. Co., 23 Wash.
325. See also 19 M1cH. L. REv. 452. In addition to !9oking and listening,
the pedestrian must exercise reasonable care for his safety in other respects.
Thus, he may not recover for an injury sustained by carelessly stepping in
front of an oncoming car which is close qpon him when he enters on the
track. Webster v. New Orleans, &c., J?y. Co., SI La. An. 299; HOMilto" v.
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Third Ave. Ry. Co., 26 N. Y. S. 754; Watkins v. Union Traction Co., 194
Pa. St. 564- But a mere error of Judgment as to the distance or speed of
the car, such as an ordinarily prudent person might make, will not necessarily preclude a recovery. Lang v. Houston, &c., Ry. Co., 75 Hun. 151.
Contra, see Sutherland v. Cle--veland, Etc., Ry. Co., 148 Ind. 3o8•. (But this
was the case of a steam train, which could not be stopped so readily as an
electric car. Upon this difference the· case is probably distinguishable.)
Obviously, where the case is one of error of judgment,. the question is for
the jury. 2 THOMPSON; NtGLIGENCE [2nd ed.], § 1452. But it does' not necessarily follow that the court should properly have left the question to the
jury in the principal case. As in ·every instance of a fact question being
taken from the jury, the query is .whether reasonable men could arrive ·at
different conclusions on the evidence adduced. So the difference between
a mere error of judgment and· an act of plain rashness and folly is one of
degree rather than of kind. On authority the court was certainly justified
in taking the question from the jury by Hamilton v. Third Ave. Ry. Co.,
supra, where the car was going but ten miles an hour and was forty feet
away, and it was, nevertheless, held contributory negligence per ,te for the
plaintiff to attempt to cross. The case of Petri v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 63 N.
Y. S. 315, would carry the court even farther than it was necessary to go in
this instance, but it seems that that case is not relied upon as law even in
New Yor_k. Inasmuch as the "scintilla rule" prevails in New York, it is at
least plausible tha.t one of the bases of the dissent in the principal case, either
conscious or otherwise, is an aversion, engendered of that rule, to taking
any fact question fro111 the jury if there is any relevant·.evidence on the point.
PAYKEN'l'-ACCEPTANCJ;; OF CHECK AS PAYMtN'l'.-P rendered professional
services for D for which D gave a check. p· sued D for services rendered
and D pleaded payment. Held, mere receipt of check subsequently dishonored is not effective as payment. Feinberg v. L~ne (Mass., 1921), 129 N.
E 393.
By the great weight of authority, in the absence of special <:ircumstances
showing an actual intent the acceptance of a check will not be treated as
payment., Nal'l Bank of Commerce v. Chicago Ry., 44 Minn. 224, 9 L. R. A.
263; Bor,. T. First Nat. Bank, 123 Ind. 78, 7 L. R. A. 442. Where an opposite view has been adopte4 (Mehlberg v. ·Tisher, 24 Wis: 6o7), it has usually
been overruled by later cases. Willo~u Lumber Co. v. Luger Furniture Co.,
102 Wis. 636; Gallagher v. Rufling, n8 Wis. 284- Even under the majority
view the debt is suspended until the check is paid or dishonored. Phoenis
Ins. Co. v. Allen, I I Mich. 501. And under either view the rule is merely
one of presumption which must yield to the actual intent of the parties. D1mcan v. Kimball, 3 Wali (U. S.) 37.
Quo WARRAN'l'O-GovtaNo?. MAY Sui; ONLY IN GENERAL PUBLIC !N'l'F.Risios.-Under a Mississippi statute providing that the governor "may bring
any proper suit affecting the general public interests," it was held that. the
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power granted contemplated only suits affecting the general public welfare
of the state as distinguished from local public interests, and that, therefore,
the governor could not bring quo warranto proceedings to oust municipal
officers. Temple et al. v. State ex rel. Russell, Governor (Miss., 1920), 86
So. 58o.
The principal question involved in the instant case is the scope of the
phrase "general public interests." The majority opinion is based on the
theory that the interests of the state and the interests of a municipality
within that state are separate and distinct. It is submitted that such a distinction is here unreasonably strict and narrow. As the dissenting opinion
points out, the municipality is but part of the state, and what 'affects the
smaller unit certainly affects the larger. A local unit is a creature of the
state, made for the specific purpose of exercising within a limited sphere the
powers of the state. It is the representative of the state and a portion of
its governmental power. United States v. Railway Co., 17 Wall. 329, 21 L.
Ed. 597; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 18o; Daniel v. Memphis, II Humph.
(Tenn.) 582. Municipalities are mere agencies, auxiliaries, or instrumentalities of th'e state. WoRDs AND PHRASts· (Second Series}, Vol. 3, p. 473; I
Dn.u>N, MuN. CoRPs. [5th Ed.], Sec. 31. The administration of justice and
the preservation of the public peace within the municipalities concern the
state at large, although these powers are actually exercised within defined
limits. People v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202. Thus it seems in
the case at bar the "general ·public interests" were involved, and the governor should have been permitted to maintain the quo warranto proceedings.
SAw-brPJ.n:D WARRANTY OF THt PURITY oF WATtR.-D, a municipal
corporation, provided the water supply to its inhabitants for domestic and
drinking purposes. The water contained typhoid germs and caused P and
his children to become ill with the disease. Held, in the absence of a showing of negligence, D was not liable. Elkus and Pound, JJ., dissenting. Canamn v. City of Mechanicsville (N. Y., 1920), 1:28 N. E. 885.
It has been generally held that a sale of food direct to the consumer
carries with it an implied warranty ef its purity, regardle~s. of whether the
sclJer had superior means of knowled~e or whether the buyer relied on the
knowledge of the seller. Chapman y. Roggenkamp, 182 Ill. App. 117; Ward
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90; Rinaldi v. Mohican Co.,
225 N. Y. 'JO. The majority of the court, however, refused to apply the
rule in the principal case on the ground that practical considerations make
inspection prohibitive. The cases where water companies have been held
liable have. been based upon the existence of negligence. Hamilton v, Madi.ron Water Co., II Me. IS7; lo7tcs v. Water Co., 87 N. J. L. 1o6. In Gret7t
v. Ashland Water Co., IOI Wis. 2:;8, the court expressly refused to find an
implied warranty of the purity of water furnished by a quasi-public corporation, but it also announced doctrines opposed to implied warranties of
any food. See FARNHAM: ON WATr:Rs AND WA'l'£JICOURStS, p. 828.
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SEAL-A Mr:ae FoRMALITY.-An Illinois statute required that the °in<'orporators seal as well as sign and acknowledge the statement of incorpc.ration.
Defendants failed to comply with the statute as to seals. In quo warranto
proceedings to test the validity of the organization as a corporation, hi!ld
(one justice dissenting), as seals are no longer of importance the statutory
direction is not mandatory and the organization i~ a corporatfo11 de jure.
People v. Ford (Ill., 1920). 128 N. E. 749.
. In a majority of the states the common law distinction betwEen sealed
and unsealed instruments has been abolished or radically modified. Illinois
still retains many of the technical rules of the common law effect of a seal,
though as early as 1827 it had enacted that a "scrawl" should have the effect
of a seal. Rtv. LA.ws, 1826-27, 320. ·Under this statute the letters "L. S.,"
the word "seal," and a device alone without words showing its purpose
have been held sufficient. Jackson v. Security Life Ins. Co., 233 Ill- l6I;
Eames v. Preston, 20 Ill. 389. Other states have reached the same result
without statute. Lorah v. Nissley, 156 Pa. 329. Some courts have been
reluctant to forsake the· old notion of the seal, even where by statute seal:>
are abolished. The rule that a seal imports consideration has been adhered·
to under such circumstances. Considine v. Gallagher~ 3I Wash. 66g. Michigan, New York and several other states have declared by statute that a
seal upon a contract is only presumptive evidence of consideration. Illinois
has not abandoned this rule except as it has been modified by the Negotiable
Instruments Law of that state. Chicago Sash, Door & Blind Mfg. Co. v.
H awns, I95 Ill. 374. And in the following respect~ the common law rules
as to sealed instruments apply there: recital of consideration m a sealed
instrument is conclusive, Ill. Cent. lnJ. Co. v. Wolf, 37 Ill. 354; a subsequent executory parol agreement cannot be shown to vary a sealed contract,
Alschu/er v. Schiff, 164 Ill. 298; neither is fraud a good defense in any action
at law on a sealed instrument, Johnson v. Prit1ting Co., 26~ Ill. 236. The
decision' in the instant case is an encouraging indication of the attitude of
the present Illinois Supreme Court towards this useless formality. It can
hardly be disputed that, in the words of the prevailing opinion, "The solemnity
of the sealed instrument is purely Pickwickian and no longer represents an
idea." See l ILL. LAW. BULL. 65; SI Au. L. REV. 369.
W1LLS--LAT£NT AMBIGUITY-EXTRINSIC EvID£N.ce.-Testator made a
bequest to trustees in trust for the New Bedford Home for Aged People.
There was no institution by this name, and the bequest was claimed ·by
both the New Bedford .Home for Aged a~d the Association for the Relief
of Aged Women of New Bedford. Held, extrinsic evidence of all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the testator and known lo him was admissible for the purpose of showing which claimant was- intended as legatee.
Kingman v. New Bedford Home for Aged, et al. (Mass., I921), 129 N. E. 449.
It was early said, and is even yet sometimes repeated, that the court
cannot go outside the four corners of a will in construing its langt1age.
W1cw~ ON EVIDENCE, § 2470, et seq. But it is now generally held that
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extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine whether a given writing is a
will; to determine the subjects and objects of bequests and devises; to show
surrounding facts and circumstances so as to put the court in the position
of the testator; to· explain latent ambiguities; and to rebut a resulting· trust.
See 17 MICH. L. R:ev. ·179. Whenever there exists an uncertainty or ampiguity
as to the beneficiary, which cannot be made clear by a construction of the
will as a whole, recourse may be had to extrinsic evidence to identify the
devisee or legatee intended. Gilmer v. Stone, I20 U. S 586; Women's U11ion
Missionary Soc. v. Mead, 131 Ill. 361; Faulkner v. National Sailors' Home,
155 Mass. 458; Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 Mich. 126; Hospital v. Royal Hcspital, go L. T. (N. S.) 601. Thus, in a bequest to a charitable institution, if
the name used by the testator is not strictly applicable to any existing institution, but partly fits two or more, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show
which was intended. Preachers' Aid Soc. v. Rich, 45 Me. 552; Wood v.
Hammond, I6 R. I. 98; Tilley v. Ellis, II9 N .. C. 233. But it has been held
that if the name used by the testator is more properly applicable to one
claimant than the other, so that the court can determine from the will which
was meant, then parol evidence will not be admissible. St. Luke's Home v.
Ass,ociation for Indigent FemtJles, 52 N. Y. 191; Tucker v. Seamen's Aid
Soc., 7 Met. 188. Although the rule is settled as above indicated, considerable confusion exists among the cases in regard to the nature of the extrinsic
evidence which is admissible. Some courts admit any evidence which bears
upon any of the facts or circumstances surrounding the testator at the time.
he made the will. Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670; Lawton v. Corleis, 127 N.
Y. loo; Women's Union Missionary Soc. v. Mead, supra; Bond's Appeal, 31
Conn. i83. Other courts seem to limit somewhat the scope of such evidence.
Cresson/s Appeal, 30 Pa. St. 437 (name of institution popularly used); Button v. American Tract Soc., 23 Vt. .336 (relations existing between testator
and claimant); Re Wol'Z!e.rton Mortgaged Estates, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 197 (testator'.st knowledge); Soufh Newmarket Methodist Seminary v. Peaslee, 15
N. H. 317 (declarations of testator). For a review of the English authorities in point with the principal case see 53 SOLICITOR'S JouR., 2u. See also
47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 514. It seems that the courts are more liberal where
the mistake is in the name of the beneficiary than where it is in the description of the subject-matter of the gift; and most liberal where the bequest
or devi~e is to. a charity.
WoRKKleN's CoKP1"NSATION-PROVOKtD AssAULT EY FoREJ.rAN NOT AN
INJURY AR.Is1NG OuT oF EuPLOY:MtNT.-A factory oiler, upon being accused
of using too much oil, called his foreman a liar, whereupon the foreman
struck him. Held (two justices dissenting). that this was not an injury
arising out of employment. Knocks v. Metal Packagt' CorporatioK et al.
(Nov., 1920), 185 N. Y. S. 309.
While differing in special applications, all the cases agree that an injury
arising from acts which the parties must have contemplated to be necessary
from the character of the work and the circumstances surrounding it is an
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injury resulting from and arising out of the employment. See 14 MICH. L.
REV. 525, and cases therein cited. See alro 12 MICH. L. R£v. 687; 19 MICH.
L. R£v. 232, 458. In Matter of McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, it was held that
where to the rational mind there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting
m1ury, so that it could be said to have been contemplated by a reasonable
person familiar with the whole situation, then it arises out of the employment. There must be a causal connection. This case has been quoted
approvingly in many cases. See Hopkins v. Michigan Sugar Co., 184 Mich.
8z; In re Sanderson's Case, 224 Mass. 558; Ohio Bid. Safety Vault Co. v.
Industrial Board, 227 Ill.¢; Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N. J. L. 161; ·Mann
v. Glastonbury.Knitting Co., 90 Conn. n6. In cases of horseplay or sportiveness injuries arising therefrom have generally been held to be outside the scope
of the employment. Matter of De Fillippis v. Falkenberg, 155 N. Y. Supp.
761, and cases therein cited. See also 19 MICH. L. R£v. 577. However, in
Leonbruno v. Champlai1i Silk Mills (N. Y., 1920), 128 N. E. 7n (noted in
19 MICH. L. REV. 456), i:ompensation was allowed where an employee was
injured in the eye by an apple thrown playfully by a fellow employee. It is
not doubted.that when a servant, in the course of employment, iS assaulted
by another he may sometimes be entitled to compensation. Griflin v. Roberson & Son, 162 N. Y. S. 313; Matter of Carbone v. Loft, decided without
opinion in 159 N. Y. S. II04- The theory is that the servant was protecting
his master's interest. Also, where an employer is carelessly served by two
men there may be an altercation and a resulting act arising out the employment. Matter of Hertz v. Ruppert, 218 N. Y. 148. Or where a workman,
who is surprised by a physical assault or an insult, reacts and strikes another,
compensation may be allowed. Malter of Verschleiser v. Stearn & Co., 2~9
N. Y. 192. The court in the instant case likened the situation there to a
case of horseplay or sportiveness, maintaining that while the emotions
prompting th~ acts are different, the purpose in both cases is the samenamety; to gratify a personal desire and not to serve the master. While
this presents a very strong case, and is probably sustained by the weight of
authority at the present time, it might be urged with a great degree of
plausibility that this was ah injury arising out of the employment. Personal
relations between employer and employee are necessary and incidental to
the business conducted. Personal altercations between employees and foremen are so natural and common that they are practically inevitable. Can
it not be said that to the rational mind such disputes are within the contemplation of the parties, that there is a causal connection between the two?
It is difficult to see why such disputes are not natural incidents of the work.

